Pennsylvania General Assembly Act III

Part Eight of the British System

This act declared that when the state treasury department could no longer "pay" its debts and was jeopardizing its depositors and creditors, the secretary of banking would be designated as receiver for the treasury and he was to file a certificate of possession in Dauphin County's Prothonotary's Office in Harrisburg, the state Capitol. As receiver for the State treasury and all its offices (meaning all the county treasurers), William D. Gordon, Secretary of Banking, was granted the authority by Act III to appoint a fiduciary to manage all the financial matters of the State. He also had the power to assign as security for loan contracts from the Federal Government, all property in the state, real and personal, resources and many other assets as insurance to the Federal Reserve.

House Joint Resolution 192 1933

(20 years after enactment of the Federal Reserve Act)

On June 5, 1933, Congress enacted HJR-192 to suspend the gold standard and to abrogate the gold clause. This resolution declared that "Whereas the holding or dealing in gold affect the public interest, and are therefore subject to proper regulation and restriction; and whereas the existing emergency has disclosed that provisions of obligations which purport to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency. . . are inconsistent with the declared policy of congress. . . in the payment of debts.

Editor's Note: HJR 192 was suspended during the 1970's and recinded during the 1980's.

This resolution declared that any obligation requiring "payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money policy; and . . . Every obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts."

A farm control bill around the same time period had attached to it a clause making Federal Reserve notes legal tender. In 1937, the Supreme Court struck down the Farm Control Act, thus carrying with it the legal tender status of Federal Reserve notes. Prior to 1933, Federal Reserve notes were used for inter-bank transfers. Around 1945, Congress passed a bill which called for the withdrawl of Federal Reserve notes from public circulation; but, they are still with us. . . *NOTE that the words do not talk about "payment" of debt, but clearly states that "Every Obligation . . . Shall be discharged."

In the case of Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 H.W. 784, the court explained the legal distinction between the words "payment" and "discharge": "There is a distinction between a `debt discharged' and a `debt paid.' When discharged the debt still exists though divested of its character as a legal obligation during the operation of the discharge. Something of the original vitality of the debt continues to exist, which may be transferred, even though the transferee takes it subject to its disability incident to the discharge. The fact that it carries something which may be a consideration for a new promise to pay, so as to make an otherwise worthless promise a legal obligation, makes it the subject of transfer by assignment."

Thus, it is clear that, as a result of HJR 192 and from that day forward (June 5, 1933), no one has been able to pay a debt. The only thing they can do is tender in transfer of debts, and the debt is perpetual. The suspension of the gold standard, and prohibition against paying debts, removed the substance for our Common Law to operate on, and created a void, as far as the law is concerned. This substance was replaced with a "Public National Credit" system where debt is money (The Federal Reserve calls it "monetized debt") over which the only jurisdiction at is Admiralty and Maritime.

HJR-192 was implemented immediately. The day after President Roosevelt signed the resolution the treasury offered the public new government securities, minus the traditional "payable in gold" clause. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, proscribes the States making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt -- but, this Article does not contain an absolute prohibition against the States making something else a tender in transfer of debt.

HJR-192 prohibits payment of debt and substitutes, in its place, a discharge of an obligation -- thereby not only subverting, but totally bypassing the "absolute prohibition" so carefully engineered into the Constitution. There is, now, nothing for this Article to operate on, just as there is nothing for Common Law to operate on. Perpetual debt, bills, notes, cheques and credits fall within a totally different jurisdiction than contemplated by Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 -- and that jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the Law of Admiralty and Maritime. Now, it is easy to see how "bills" as plenty as oak leaves, "polluted the laws after the War For Independence, as described by Peletiah Webster". This is how we lost access to substantive Common Law -- the very law the Minute Men fought to regain.

HJR-192 places every person who deals in the public national credit in the legal position of a merchant, and the only jurisdiction over any controversy involving this subject matter is Admiralty and Maritime. Obviously, if we cannot pay our debts at law, we are also benefiting from limited liability under the Limited Liability Act when we use this credit-- and, that is marine insurance!

The definitions of "liability" and "insure" will help convince us of this fact -- in analyzing these definitions, keep in mind the distinction between "payment" and "discharge". Liability: The word is a broad term. Ithas been defined to mean: all character of debts and obligations. . . any kind of debt or liability, either absolute or contingent, express or implied . . . condition which creates a duty to perform an act immediately or in the future . . . duty to pay money or to perform some other service . . . the state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay, or make good something. "Insure: "To engage to indemnify a person against pecuniary loss from specified perils or possible liability".

QUESTION #1: Who do you suppose took possession of the treasury of the State of Pa. on June 5, 1933, -- the moment HJR-192 made it impossible for the State of Pennsylvania to pay its debts?

QUESTION #2: Land titles being allodial in Pennsylvania, what was the State Assembly's authority and jurisdiction to pledge these allodiums to the Federal Reserve as security for loan contracts from the Federal Government?

QUESTION #3: If the individual citizens of Pennsylvania were indeed "sovereign" under the Common Law -- What was the authority and jurisdiction of the State Assembly to pledge their labor to the Federal Reserve pool?

Clearly, the alleged authority and jurisdiction is the so-called public policy declared by Congress. We will return to this subject later on.

If all the assets of the United States have been hypothecated to the Federal Reserve "pool" as security for the maritime loan and insurance underwriting policy, then that raises a couple of questions: QUESTION #1: If the United States "dies" (or is merged) under a One World government, who gets the pool? QUESTION #2: If the Federal Reserve "dies" by way of getting its charter rescinded, who gets the pool?

The answers can be found in the Federal Reserve Act itself: "Should a Federal Reserve bank be dissolved or go into liquidation, any surplus remaining, after the payment of all debts, dividend requirements as hereinbefore provided, and the par value of the stock, shall be paid to and become the property of the United States and shall be similarly applied".

31 USC 315B provided that: "No gold shall after January 30, 1934, be coined, and no gold coin shall after January 30, 1934, be paid out or delivered by the United States; provided however, that coinage may continue to be executed by the mints of the United States for foreign countries". This exception was necessary because foreign countries, being recognized or sovereign, could not be held to the internal public policy of the United States. HJR-192 was binding only upon those individuals who were beneficiaries of public policy; that being the privilege of limited liability for payment of debt arising out of participation in the Federal Reserve Public Credit System.

HJR-192 automatically extended the privilege to renege on debts to every person using the Federal Reserve banking system; however, never forget that when you operate on a privilege, you have to respect the ruler of the giver of that privilege. Furthermore, in the case of Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, the court said: "The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits."

Thus, if you avail yourself of any benefits of the public credit system you waive the right to challenge the validity of any statute pertaining to, and conferring "benefits" of this system on the basis of constitutionality. cmlaw8.htm

Proceed To PART NINE