There are only Three Jurisdictions -- and No More

Part Four of the British System

All three of these jurisdictions have cognizance over civil matters, as contradistinguished from criminal matters, depending on the subject matter in controversy and nature of the cause.

If, it is an action at Common Law properly brought into a common law court, the court is bound by the principles, rules and procedures of Common Law. If the action is properly brought before an Equity or Admiralty court, the court is bound by the principles, rules and procedures of the civil law dealing with the subject matter.

Equity has no cognizance over criminal matters and, therefore, in criminal cases there are only two jurisdictions -- every criminal case must be prosecuted either in the jurisdiction of Common Law, or that of the Law of Admiralty. In criminal cases, Common Law courts are bound by the principles, rules and procedures of the Common Law. In Admiralty cases, the court is bound by the principles, rules and procedures of Admiralty and Maritime Law.

You will see, subsequently, that State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in both Common Law and Maritime law concerning certain types of cases and subject matter. You also will see that in these cases, if the subject matter or nature of this cause is Maritime that, even if it is heard in a Common Law court, that court is bound to apply the Maritime Law to the case. We also will show that no Admiralty court in the land as any jurisdiction to hear Common Law issues.

Briefly, here are some distinctive differences between the principles, rules and procedures of common law and civil law:

    Common Law

  • Right to trial by jury
  • 12 judges -- the jury
  • 12 judges:
    control the trial
    judge justice of law
    determine admissibility of evidence
    apply law to facts
    render verdict according to conscience

    Civil Law

  • No right to trial by jury
  • ONE judge (chancelor)
  • One chancelor controls trial:
    jury is advisory to chancelor
    chancelor determines admissibility of evidence
    jury must accept the law as given by chancelor
    jury renders verdict according to law dictated and evidence presented

The Supreme Court analysed these two sections of the judiciary act in the Huntress case in 1840: The Huntress case was a libel in personam against the owners of the steamship Huntress. The Court said: "In these, and in analogous cases, the only question that can be considered as an open one is, whether they come within that clause of the Constitution that says, the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "all causes of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction." If they do, then the original cognizance of them is by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, given to the district court". . . . "The argument, that this clause is controlled by the Seventh Amendment, which secures the right of trial by jury in all suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, has no application to the constitutional grant; because these are not suits at Common Law";

And, in the DeLovio vs. Boit case, Justice Story said: "And, the ground is made stronger by the consideration, that the right of trial by jury is preserved by the constitution in all suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars; and by the statute this right is excluded in all cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction." Here we have a clear statement, by the Supreme Court that there is no access to Common Law in courts of Admiralty.

In 1832, the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania very ably addressed the meaning and intent of the 7th amendment in the case of Bains v. The Schooner James and Catherine, as follows: ". . . by attempting to introduce the admiralty jurisdiction of the civil law, . . . a foundation is laid for interminable conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts of the State and the Union." "It is vain to contend that the Seventh Amendment will be any efficient guarantee for the right, in suits at Common law, if an Admiralty jurisdiction exists in the United States, commensurate with what is claimed by the claimant in this case. Its assertion is, in my opinion, a renewal of the contest between legislative power and royal prerogative, the Common and the Civil Law, striving for mastery; the one to secure, the other to take away the trial by jury, . . . judicial power must first annul the Seventh Amendment, or judicial subtly transform a suit at Common Law, into a case of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction, before I take cognizance as such a case as this without a jury."

Thus, Admiralty is Civil Law, and, once again, Common Law is not accessible in courts of Admiralty -- and, as J. Reuben Clark said: there is a constant ideological conflict between Civil and Common Law for the control of society.

In the preface to his book "Honest Money", Dr. Norburn wrote: "What a marvellous country was this new world -- AMERICA. Its coastline, dotted with deep harbors, seemed endless. It had great mountains and great rivers. There were magnificent forests and vast fertile plains. Its earth was rich with minerals. Those who came to live in this veritable paradise were of sturdy stock. They were industrious, saving and ingenious. They had the best government ever devised. How does it happen that now, after more than three hundred years of intense toil, the inhabitants of this nation find themselves more than ten trillion dollars in debt? They have received no benefits to justify this debt. To whom do they owe it? How were the claims acquired?

As you will see, the factual answers to Dr. Norburn's questions, and proper application of the appropriate law to these facts, provide us the necessary fact and law to build a winning case that can restore our access to Common Law; and can restore our allodial land titles.

Introduction of the George Rapp Society:

First Successful communistic, religious, organization in the United States.

The society was designed for profit making (for some) and its formula included a controlled economy under limited liability, which, as you will see before this rresentation is over, are the same ingredients of the Federal Reserve formula that is running this country today! This is the formula that brought admiralty inland and has barred our access to substantive Common Law.

George Rapp Harmony Society -- 1805 (Re: Schriber v. Rapp, Pa. Supreme Court, 351) George Rapp founded the "Harmony Society" in 1805, at Harmony, in Beaver County, Pa., subsequently moved to Harmony on the Wabash, in the state of Indiana, and then moved to "Economy" in Beaver County, Pa. The nature of this society was brought to light in the case of Schriber v. Rapp in 1836. This case was an action of account brought by Jacob Schriber, administrator of Peter Schriber, deceased, against George Rapp and others, doing business in company under the name of Harmony Society. To sustain the action, the plaintiff proved by testimony that the Harmony Society possessed a great deal of wealth in the form of personal property, real property, factories, etc. It was a pool of property.

Witness, Dr. Smith, once a member of the association stated: "They intended to make money when they entered into it; it was a part of their object. I believe there were Articles at Harmony, but everyone was not obliged to sign it. Equal rights, equal enjoyments and equal profits. Rapp said it should not be incorporated, for that would take too much power from him. Rapp was not elected. He assumed the power that Moses and Aaron had. If anyone would not do what he said, he would say, `What have you to do about it? I have the power -- I could crush you. All you have to do is obey.' He got worse as he got wealthy."

George Rapp was a preacher -- and a very persuasive one. Adam Shelly testified on behalf of the plaintiff respecting the first articles of association on the Wabash. "The people were directed to come in companies, one of them read it and the rest signed it. As to the article signed at Economy, Rapp made a long speech. Said any one who would sign it would have his name written in the Lamb's Book of Life. If they did not, their names would be blotted out, and God would ask him about it."

Defendants, to sustain the issue on their part, produced in evidence the articles of association. Some pertinent excerpts are as follows:

Article 1: We the undersigned, for ourselves and our heirs, executors and administrators, do hereby give, grant and forever convey, to the said George Rapp and his associates, and their heirs, and assigns, all our property. . . for the benefit of said association or community.

Article 2: We do further covenant and agree to and with the said George Rapp and his associates, that we will severally submit faithfully to the laws and regulations of said community, . . . therefore holding ourselves bound to promote the interest and welfare of the said community, not only by the labor of our own hands, but also by that of our children, our families and all others who now are or hereafter may be under our control.

Article 3: . . .that we will never claim or demand either for ourselves, our children, or for anyone belonging to us, directly or indirectly, any compensation, wages or reward whatever, for our, or their labor or services, rendered to the said community, . . .

Article 5: The said George Rapp and his associates further agree to supply the undersigned severally with all the necessaries of life. . . and to such extent as their circumstances may require.

Article 6: If any of the undersigned. . . should withdraw from the association, then the said George Rapp and his associates agree to refund to him or them the value of all such property without interest, as he or they may have brought into the community. . . Said value to be refunded. . . as the said George Rapp and his associates shall determine.

The court ruled for defendant George Rapp on the basis that "an association for the purpose expressed is prohibited neither by statute nor the common law." And the court also stated: "It is supposed, however, that as the intestate had power, by the articles, to secede from the society and take out whatever he brought into it, the successor to his personal rights may exercise it as his representative. Such, however, are not the terms of the articles. . . The right of accession, therefore, is intransmissable." The court also stated that "the law knows no duress by advise and persuasion", and, therefore there was no fraud in the inducement to sign the article.

In analyzing this case, we see that: 1. The complaint was brought under the jurisdiction of common law. 2. The plaintiff lost because of the common law and constitutionally protected right to contract. 3. Under the common law, the only way to break the contract was to prove fraud. 4. According to testimony, the members of the association "intended to make money when they entered into it."

The witnesses did not explain how they expected to "make money" under the terms of the contract. The only reasonable explanation is that they were gambling that they would be last survivors in the Association -- and share in the distribution of assets; and/or they expected to benefit from limited liability by sharing any loses of the association with the other members. Last survivors take all in a wagering policy, and mutual sharing of losses is insurance.

In analyzing the George Rapp Association formula, we see:

1. The contract contained a forfeiture clause. (Members would "never claim compensation;" upon withdrawal, value of property would be refunded "without interest" -- The right of accession of property donated to the Association is intransmissable to heirs of the decedent.

2. Rapp and his associates had no risk as the insurer. They not only had nothing to lose in the event of death of a contributor and member -- but gained all property donated with no possible claim from heirs of the decedent.

3. It was a controlled economy -- under the exclusive control of George Rapp and his associates.

4. There was no accountability to members of the Association. . .

You will see, later on, that if Schriber had taken these facts into an Admiralty court and applied the proper Admiralty Law to these facts -- he should have won his case.

One additional note on George Rapp --- George Rapp continued to gain affluence and prestige -- and dignitaries came from all over the world to his mansion at "Economy" to marvel at the fantastic success of his society.

Why shouldn't he be successful? By contract, he had slave labor, donations of untold wealth from members who, if they chose to withdraw before they died, could only get back the equivalent of what they had donated without interest; and, if they died as a member, the property and assets donated remained in the society as long as it existed.

George Rapp died in 1847; however, the society went on. Evidence will show that the tremendous wealth accumulated by this society was subsequently used to fashion a George Rapp Society on a much larger scale -- with plans to ultimately encompass the world in a "superstate" controlled and governed by mercantile interests, under the law of admiralty -- a superstate wherein all the property in the world, and all the people on space-ship "Earth", are pledged to the benefit of this World-wide mercantile association. The "New World Order?

DeLovio v. Bott [1815]:

In 1815, in the case of DeLovio v. Boit, the Supreme Court ruled the following: [Opinion written by Justice Story]: "The Admiralty, from the highest antiquity, has exercised a very extensive criminal jurisdiction, and punished offenses by fine and imprisonment. The celebrated inquisition at Queensborough, in the reign of Edward III, would alone be decisive. And, even at Common Law it had been adjudged, that the Admiralty might fine for contempt. . . Appeal, and not a Writ of Error, lies for its decrees. . . Yet, it is conceded on all sides, that of maritime hypothecations of the Admiralty depends, or ought to depend, as to contracts upon the subject matter, i.e. whether maritime or not; and as to torts, upon locality. . .

Neither the Judicial Act nor the Constitution, which it follows, limit the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the District Court in any respect to place. It is bounded only by the nature of the cause over which it is to decide. On the whole, I am, without the slightest hesitation, ready to pronounce, that the delegation of cognizance of `all civil cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction' to the Courts of the United States comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulation) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.

The next inquiry is, what are properly to be deemed "maritime contracts." Happily, in this particular there is little room for controversy. All civilians and jurists agree, that in this appellation are included, among other things, marine hypothecations . . .and, what is more material to our present purpose, policies of insurance. . . My judgement accordingly is, that policies of insurance are within (though not exclusively within) the Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction of the United States." cmlaw4.htm

Proceed To PART FIVE